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Recent shocks in the European debt markets have given ﬁnancial market partici-
pants deep concerns about the rapidly-growing amount of sovereign credit risk in
the global ﬁnancial system. These concerns have increased with the rapid widening
of all credit spreads throughout Europe in the wake of the Greek and Irish debt
crises. This widening has also raised fears that sovereign credit risk may be far
more systemic in nature than previously anticipated. Given the massive size of
the sovereign debt markets, it is clear that understanding the systemic nature of
sovereign credit risk is of fundamental importance.1
Furthermore, studying systemic sovereign credit risk may also help resolve the
longstanding debate about the source of systemic risk in ﬁnancial crises. In partic-
ular, one strand of the literature views systemic risk as arising from the eﬀects of
common macroeconomic shocks on economic fundamentals. Key examples include
Gorton (1988), Calomiris and Gorton (1991), Allen and Gale (2000a), Calomiris
and Mason (2003), Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2008, 2009), and others. In contrast, the
other strand focuses primarily on the role that ﬁnancial markets play in creating
systemic risk through channels such as capital ﬂows, funding availability, risk pre-
mia, and liquidity shocks. Importantexamples include Diamond and Dybvig (1983),
Kaminski, Reinhart, and Vegh (2003), Allen and Gale (2000b), Kodres and Pritsker
(2002), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Allen, Babus, and Carletti (2009), and
others.
This paper provides an entirely new perspective on systemic sovereign credit
risk by contrasting the systemic credit risk of states within the U.S. with that of
sovereign issuers within Europe. For the U.S., we examine the systemic credit risk
of the U.S. itself and ten of the largest states by GDP such as California, Texas,
and New York. In Europe, our dataset consists of countries within the European
Monetary Union (EMU). We examine the credit risk of both core countries, such as
France and the Netherlands, and periphery countries, such as Greece and Ireland.
In many ways, the relation between U.S. states closely parallels that of the
sovereigns in the EMU. First, under the U.S. Constitution, states are sovereign
entities and can repudiate their debts without bondholders being able to claim assets
in a bankruptcy process. In fact, several states have defaulted on and repudiated
debt in the past. Thus, states within the U.S. have sovereign immunity just as
1As evidence of the growing seriousness of the problem, Standard and Poors cut its
outlook on the AAA rating of the U.S. from stable to negative on April 18, 2011.
Furthermore, discussions of the possibility of a default by the U.S. or by a U.S.
state are becoming much more frequent in the ﬁnancial press. For example, see
Samuelson (2009), Wessel (2010), Buttonwood (2010), and Rampell (2011).
1countries within the EMU. Second, each set of sovereigns is in a currency union;
U.S states share the dollar as a common currency, while EMU members have the
Euro as their common currency. In addition, there are many economic, legal, and
political linkages between states, just as there are similar linkages among European
countries. On the other hand, sovereign debtors in the U.S. have much closer ﬁscal
linkages than is the case in the EMU. Thus, if systemic risk is driven by common
shocks to macroeconomic fundamentals, one would expect a higher level of systemic
risk among U.S. states than would be the case among European sovereigns.
In this study, we make useof a novel dataset of state and sovereigncredit default
swap (CDS) spreads. An key advantage of using CDS data is that it provides a much
more direct measure of the credit risk of a sovereign than do sovereign debt spreads.
This is because sovereign debt spreads are driven not only by sovereign credit risk,
but also by interest rate movements, changes in the supply of the underlying bond,
illiquidity eﬀects in sovereign debt prices, and other factors.
In studying sovereign credit risk, our approach will be to ﬁrst develop an aﬃne
credit framework that allows for both systemic risk and sovereign-speciﬁc risk. In
particular, we extend an aﬃne sovereign credit model similar to that of Pan and Sin-
gleton (2008) and Longstaﬀ, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2011) to a multivariate
setting. In this framework, nonsystemic shocks lead to individual sovereign defaults
while the realization of a systemic shock may trigger a cascade of defaults. We esti-
mate the multivariate model using the full cross section of CDS term structure data
for U.S. sovereigns, and similarly for the European sovereigns. A key advantage
of this approach is that it provides us with a direct measure of the sensitivity of
sovereign debtors to systemic shocks.
A number of important empirical results emerge from this analysis. First, we
ﬁnd that there is dramatic variation across sovereigns in terms of their exposure
to systemic shocks. For example, California has more than ﬁve times as much
systemic risk as the average for the other states in the sample, and nearly three
times as much as the U.S. Treasury. In stark contrast, New York has virtually no
systemic risk; New York’s credit risk appears to be almost entirely idiosyncratic
in nature. In Europe, Greece has about three times the systemic risk of other
vulnerable sovereigns such as Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Belgium, which,
in turn, have roughly twice as much systemic risk as the remaining sovereigns in
the EMU.
Second, we show that there is much less systemic sovereign risk in the U.S. than
in Europe. In particular, systemic credit risk represents only about 12 percent of the
total credit risk of U.S. states. In contrast, systemic credit risk constitutes about
31 percent of the total credit risk of the European sovereigns. These results pro-
vide direct evidence against the hypothesis that the tighter macroeconomic linkages
should lead to higher levels of systemic risk in the U.S. than in Europe.
2Third, we ﬁnd that systemic sovereign credit risk in both the U.S. and Europe
is strongly related to ﬁnancial market variables. Speciﬁcally, systemic sovereign
credit risk in the U.S. declines signiﬁcantly when the S&P 500 increases, and sim-
ilarly for Europe when the DAX increases. Systemic sovereign risk in the U.S.
is also signiﬁcantly related to changes in interest rates and and corporate credit.
Curiously, U.S. systemic risk is strongly negatively related to changes in the VIX
volatility index. This is consistent with the view that when global ﬁnancial markets
experience turbulence, the U.S. may beneﬁt from ﬂight-to-quality-related capital
ﬂows. These results provide new evidence that systemic risk has deep roots in the
ﬂows and liquidity of ﬁnancial markets.
There is an extensive literature on sovereign credit risk. Previous theoretical
work focuses on the incentives faced by sovereign debtors to repay their debt. Exam-
ples include Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Grossman and Van Huyck (1988), Bulow
and Rogoﬀ (1989a, b), Atkeson (1991), Dooley and Svenson (1994), Cole and Kehoe
(1996, 2000), Dooley (2000), and many others. A number of empirical studies focus
on the factors that determine individual sovereign credit spreads. These include Ed-
wards (1984, 1986, 2002), Berg and Sachs (1988), Boehmer and Megginson (1990),
Duﬃe, Pedersen, and Singleton (2003), and Zhang (2003). Some recent research
provides evidence that sovereign credit spreads are related to common global and ﬁ-
nancial market factors. For example, see Kamin and von Kleist (1999), Eichengreen
and Mody (2000), Mauro, Sussman, and Yafeh (2002), Geyer, Kossmeier, and Pich-
ler (2004), Rozada and Yeyati (2005), Remolona, Scatigna, and Wu (2008), Pan and
Singleton (2008), and Longstaﬀ, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2011). This paper
contributes to the literature by being the ﬁrst to focus on U.S. sovereign credit risk
and to contrast it with U.S. state credit risk and sovereign credit risk within the
EMU. The paper also is the ﬁrst to estimate the systemic component of sovereign
credit spreads from the cross section of CDS term structures.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses federal
and state credit risk within the U.S. and compares it with European sovereigns.
Section 3 describes the sovereign CDS data used in the study. Section 4 presents
the multivariate aﬃne credit model. Section 5 discusses the estimation of the model.
Section 6 studies systemic credit risk of sovereigns in the U.S. and Europe. Section
7 explores the properties of the sovereign-speciﬁc portion of sovereign credit risk.
Section 8 provides concluding remarks.
2. U.S. FEDERAL, STATE, AND EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNS
U.S. states are comparable to EMU member countries in many ways. First, the
GDP of states is roughly similar to the GDP of European countries. Second, and
probably less familiar, is that U.S. states have the same sovereign immunity as
3countries in that states can repudiate debt, creditors have few, if any, rights to
claim assets, and there is no bankruptcy mechanism. Third, both U.S. states and
European nations have long histories of default.
2.1 Economic Size of U.S. States and European Sovereigns
The GDP of U.S. states is roughly comparable to the GDP of EMU countries both
in terms of levels and dispersion. Table 1 reports the 2009 nominal GDP of the
U.S. states and EMU countries used in our study. California’s economy is larger
than Spain and approximately 90 percent the size of Italy and 70 percent the size
of France. The dispersion of GDP across the largest states is also roughly similar
to the dispersion of GDP across EMU countries. Florida is roughly equivalent to
the Netherlands and Ohio has approximately the same GDP as Belgium. Michi-
gan, despite its recent industrial decline, still has an economy greater than Greece,
Portugal, or Ireland taken separately. Thus, U.S. states are roughly comparable
economically to their EMU country counterparts.
2.2 Sovereign vs. Corporate Default
Sovereign default is diﬀerent from corporate default in three important ways. First,
if a corporation decides not to repay its debts, bondholders would sue and the courts
would hand over assets held in collateral to the bond holders. The U.S. bankruptcy
code (Chapters 7 and 11) has both liquidation and restructuring mechanisms to
enforce creditor rights. In contrast, if a sovereign repudiates, most of the assets are
located domestically within a country and a sovereign cannot credibly commit to
handing these assets over in the event of default.
Second, the concept of sovereign immunity protects sovereign assets, even when
they are held outside the country. Sovereign immunity prevents individuals from
suing countries. Several court cases, international treaties, and legislative changes
have weakened the protection of sovereign immunity, but it remains the case that
in the U.S., the federal government cannot be sued by an individual unless it has
waived immunity or consented to a suit.2 The grounds for a suit, as speciﬁed for
example in the 1946 Federal Tort Claims Act, are very narrow and apply only when
a federal employee has committed a tort (and excludes breaches of contract).
Third, unlike corporate default, there is no international recognized process for
handling sovereign defaults. Certainly, there are international bodies such as the In-
2See Panizza, Sturzengger and Zettelmeyer (2009) for a recent summary of these
developments and a summary of the sovereign default literature.
4ternational Monetary Fund and consortiums of commercial banks and governments
which have helped restructure sovereign debt in the various international debt crises
in the 20th Century (see Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009) for a detailed timeline), but
these have all been ad-hoc responses. Despite some economists showing that an
international bankruptcy regime for restructuring defaulted sovereign bonds would
be optimal (see, for example, Bolton and Jeanne, (2007)), currently there is no such
mechanism for dealing with sovereign default.
State debt is similar to sovereign debt. The 11th Amendment to the U.S. Con-
stitution guarantees that states are treated as sovereigns—no individual, domestic
or foreign, can bring suit against a state, with one exception. Suits can be brought
against states only with the consent of a state.3 Thus, just as individual investors
cannot claim the assets of the federal government, investors cannot seize state prop-
erty. Furthermore, in the one case where another sovereign sued a state (Principality
of Monaco v. Mississippi), the Supreme Court ruled in 1934 that foreign countries
cannot sue U.S. states without their consent. Thus, states have sovereign status and
there is also no bankruptcy mechanism for handling state default in the U.S., just
as there is no international sovereign bankruptcy court.4 Thus, state and federal
debt have economically equivalent status.
In summary, state governments have sovereign protection. This makes U.S.
state debt similar to the sovereign debt of sovereign countries—individual investors
cannot claim state property or the property of sovereign nations, there is no ability
to force a state to pay in the even of repudiation, and there is no legal mechanism
to restructure defaulting state debts. The last would not be important if U.S. states
would never default – but they have in the past, and may in the future, as we now
describe.
2.3 U.S. Federal and State Default
Although the U.S. has legally never defaulted on its debt, it has unilaterally changed
the terms of its debt. The 1934 Gold Reserve Act changed the value of a U.S. dollar
from $20.67 per troy ounce to $35. Economically this is a default; the U.S. reduced
the value of its debt payments relative to an external measure of value and at that
time all major currencies were backed by gold. Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2008) classify
3It is notable that despite the many attempts to collect money through the courts
from defaulted states, not one defaulting state has ever given consent (see McGrane
(1935) for a detailed account).
4Local municipalities in certain states can enter Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code
similar to Chapter 11 for corporations. However, this does not apply to states.
5the U.S. abrogation of the gold clause in 1934 as a default.
In contrast to the implicit default on federal obligations during the Great De-
pression, the history of state debt in the U.S. is littered with episodes of explicit
defaults. Many states have defaulted. In the 1830s and 1840s, several states is-
sued debt to ﬁnance canals and railroads. McGrane (1935) discusses these events
in detail and lists eight defaulting states and one territory: Arkansas, Florida Ter-
ritory, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Pennsylvania.
McGrane notes that most states resumed payment, but Florida Territory and Mis-
sissippi repudiated their debt completely (also see English (1996)).
These bonds were widely held in Europe, particularly in the United Kingdom.
Markham (2002) notes that the drop in value of these bonds and their credit risk
was the subject of a nightmare of Ebenezer Scrooge in Charles Dickens’ 1843 novel,
A Christmas Carol, in which Scrooge’s investments withered into a “mere United
States security.”
The partial or complete repudiation of these states’ debts was even placed
in states’ constitutions, or legislation was passed prohibiting payment. McGrane
(1935) recounts that when Florida achieved statehood, it wiped out its debt by leg-
islative ﬁat and its legislature voted that it did not bear liability for debts incurred
while Florida was still a territory. Similarly, in 1875, Mississippi’s state constitution
was amended forbidding any payment on bonds issued on behalf of its two chartered
banks, Planters’ and the Union. Arkansas defaulted in 1941 and the ﬁrst amend-
ment to the Arkansas constitution in 1875, which was adopted by an overwhelming
popular vote of eight to one, made it illegal to ever pay the interest or principal on
the defaulted state railroad and levee bonds (see Bayliss (1964)).
Ten states also defaulted after the Civil War during the 1870s and 1880s: Al-
abama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Minnesota, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. All of these states with one exception, Min-
nesota, took on large debts during the period of Reconstruction and were unable
to service them. As McGrane (1935) describes, Minnesota’s case is particularly
interesting because it was a state untouched by the Civil War. Minnesota defaulted
on railroad bonds and although the Governor and other state oﬃcials were will-
ing to make investors whole, they were stymied for over 20 years by constitutional
amendments passed by Minnesota repudiating the “swindling bonds”.
Arkansas has the dubious distinction of the only state to default three times.
Its last default, which was also the last default of any state, was in 1933 during the
Great Depression. Arkansas defaulted on highway bonds. Reaves (1943) describes
that the defaulting bonds were partially refunded in 1934, but it was only in 1943
that the majority of the defaulting issues were reﬁnanced and the state returned to
good standing in debt markets.
6Clearly, states have defaulted in the past. Investors in defaulted federal or state
debt have little redress to settle their claims. Furthermore, in all defaulting state
cases so far, the federal government did not step in to make investors whole.
2.4 EMU Country Default
There have also been defaults among countries which are currently members of
the EMU.5 Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2008) describe several of these episodes. During
the Great Depression, Greece went oﬀ the gold standard in 1932 and declared a
moratorium on all debt payments. Spain suspended interest payments on external
debt from 1936–1939 during the Spanish Civil War. Several nations defaulted on
debt raised to ﬁght World War II, including Austria, which rendered many previous
bond issues worthless in 1945, and Germany, which instituted a brutal currency
reform in 1948 by introducing the Deutschmark and rendering most balances in
the previous currency, the Reichmark, close to worthless. However, an important
diﬀerence between these defaults and the situation of EMU member countries today
is that these defaults were done when each country had a separate currency. In
contrast, the previous defaults of the U.S. states happened under a currency union.
Future possible defaults of EMU sovereigns would occur with this feature.
3. THE DATA
As discussed in Duﬃe (1999), Longstaﬀ, Mithal, and Neis (2005), Pan and Singleton
(2008), and many others, a CDS contract functions as an insurance contract against
the event that an entity such as a ﬁrm or a sovereign defaults on its debt. To
illustrate how a CDS contract works, consider the case of California. On January
5, 2011, the market premium or spread for a ﬁve-year CDS contract on California
was 295 basis points. If there was no default, the buyer would pay the equivalent
of an annuity of 295 basis points for the full ﬁve-year horizon of the contract. If
there was a default, however, the buyer of credit protection could sell the defaulted
debt to the protection seller at its par value of 100, after which the contract would
terminate. In general, this default-linked cash ﬂow is triggered by the default of a
speciﬁc reference obligation of the underlying entity.6
5Other non-EMU countries within the European Union have also defaulted. For
example, the United Kingdom last defaulted in 1932 when most of its outstanding
debt incurred during World War I was consolidated into a 3.5 percent consol bond.
6For a detailed discussion of the characteristics of CDS contracts, see Longstaﬀ,
Mithal, and Neis (2005) and Pan and Singleton (2008).
7The data for the study include weekly midmarket CDS spreads for the term
structure of one-year, two-year, three-year, four-year, and ﬁve-year CDS contracts
on the U.S. Treasury and ten states. These states are California, Florida, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Texas. The
data are obtained from the Bloomberg system which collects CDS market quotation
data from industry sources. The notional for the U.S. Treasury CDS contract is
speciﬁed in Euros. The notional for the state CDS contracts is speciﬁed in dollars.
The data for the study cover the 139-week period from May 14, 2008 to January 5,
2011. The beginning of this sample period is dictated by the availability of liquid
CDS data for all of the states in the study.
In addition to the U.S. data, we also collect the corresponding CDS term struc-
ture data for 11 of the largest sovereign borrowers within the EMU: Austria, Bel-
gium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal,
and Spain. The data for the European sovereigns also cover the period from May
14, 2008 to January 5, 2011. The notional amounts for the European data are all
s p e c i ﬁ e di nd o l l a r s . 7
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the federal and state ﬁve-year CDS
spreads. All spreads are denominated in basis points.8 The average values of the
spreads range widely across the various sovereigns. The average CDS spread for the
U.S. Treasury is 38.52 basis points. The average spreads for the ten states are all
higher than for the U.S. Treasury, and range from a low of 86.82 basis points for
Texas to a high of 243.57 basis points for California.9
Both the standard deviations and the minimum/maximum values indicate that
there is signiﬁcant time-series variation in the CDS spreads. For example, the
ﬁve-year CDS spread for the U.S. Treasury reached a maximum of 99.26 basis
points in early 2009. Around the same time period, the CDS spreads for California
and Michigan reached maximum values of 402 basis points and 394 basis points,
7For several of the European sovereigns, ﬁve-year CDS data is missing for a few
weeks. For these weeks, we use four-year CDS data to report summary statistics
and use the one-year to four-year term structure data to conduct the empirical
analysis.
8Recently, many CDS contracts are executed on the basis of the protection seller
paying points up front rather than a running spread. Despite this, however, the
market convention is to quote CDS contracts in terms of their equivalent running
spread. We adopt this standard market convention in this paper.
9Even though the notional for the CDS contract on the Treasury is denominated
in Euros, the CDS spread is expressed as a rate and is, therefore, free of units
of account. Thus, no currency translation is required for the U.S. Treasury CDS
contract.
8respectively. The median values of the CDS spreads are typically fairly close to the
average values.
Table 2 also reports summary statistics for the ﬁve-year CDS spreads of the
European sovereigns in the sample. As shown, many of the average CDS spreads are
smaller than those for the states. On the other hand, many of the maximum values
for the European sovereigns are comparable to those for the states. The reason
for this simply that while both U.S. and European sovereigns had similar CDS
spreads at the beginning of the sample periods, CDS spreads in the U.S. widened
more rapidly as the subprime/ﬁnancial crisis unfolded than did European spreads.
After the Greek credit crisis of mid-2010, however, European CDS spreads quickly
increased to levels comparable to, or even in excess of, those in the U.S.
To providesome additionaldescriptivestatistics, Table3 reports the correlation
matrix of weekly changes in the ﬁve-year CDS spreads. The top panel reports the
correlations for the U.S. while the bottom panel reports the correlations for Europe.
Focusing ﬁrst on U.S. sovereigns, the top panel of Table 3 shows that while
there is clearly signiﬁcant cross-sectional correlation in spreads, the correlations are
far from perfect. Most of the correlations are less than 70 percent, and many are
less than 50 percent. The average correlation across all 11 U.S. sovereigns is only
55.6 percent.
Turning next to the European sovereigns, the bottom panel of Table 3 shows
that the cross-sectional correlations tend to be similar in magnitude or slightly
higher than those for the U.S. In particular, the average correlation across all 11
European sovereigns is 58.4 percent. This result is somewhat surprising given that
we would expect a stronger linkage within the U.S. since U.S. sovereigns would
presumably have stronger ﬁscal, political, and economic connections than would be
the case for the countries in the EMU. The stronger correlation among European
sovereigns, however, is consistent with the results in Longstaﬀ, Pan, Pedersen, and
Singleton (2011) who report that the average correlation of changes in credit spreads
across 26 developed and emerging market sovereigns was 73 percent for the 2007–
2010 period.
Although not shown, we note that the correlations between the U.S. and Eu-
rope are relatively weak relative to the correlations intra-U.S. and intra-EMU. For
example, the average pairwise correlation between the U.S. sovereigns and the Eu-
ropean sovereigns is only 25.6 percent. These results, taken in context with those
previously documented in the literature for other sovereigns, hint that the nature
of U.S. sovereign credit risk may diﬀer fundamentally from that of other sovereigns.
Finally, Table 4 reports the results from a simple principal components analysis
for the U.S. sovereigns and for the European sovereigns. The analysis is based on the
9correlation matrix of weekly changes in the ﬁve-year CDS spreads for the sovereigns
in the two regions.
The results indicate that there is greater commonality among the European
sovereigns than among the U.S sovereigns. In particular, the ﬁrst principal com-
ponent for the U.S. sovereigns explains slightly less than the ﬁrst principal compo-
nent for the European sovereigns. The ﬁrst two principal components for the U.S.
sovereigns, however, explain only 70.28 percent of the variation, while the same
measure for the European sovereigns is 82.54 percent. The results for the ﬁrst three
principal components are similar. As before, these results are very puzzling given
that we would expect credit risk within the U.S. to be more closely linked than
would be the case for credit risk within the EMU.
4. MODELING CDS SPREADS WITH SYSTEMIC RISK
There is an extensive literature on modeling sovereign credit spreads. Many recent
papers follow the approach of developing a model of the term structure of sovereign
spreads and then ﬁtting the model to observed yields or CDS spreads. Important
examples of this approach include Duﬃe, Pedersen, and Singleton (2003), Pan and
Singleton (2008), and Longstaﬀ, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2011). Motivated
by this literature, we also develop a closed-form model for the term structure of
sovereign CDS spreads. A key distinction of our framework, however, is that is
introduces the possibility that sovereign defaults may be triggered by the realization
of a systemic shock. Thus, in contrast to previous work that models sovereign CDS
term structures in a univariate setting, we develop an a multivariate credit model
in which joint defaults of sovereigns are explicitly captured in the model. This
modeling framework represents a signiﬁcant extension of the literature on modeling
sovereign default risk.
Speciﬁcally, we allow for two independent types of credit events to trigger
sovereign defaults. The ﬁrst is an idiosyncratic shock that triggers the default
of an individual sovereign. This type of credit event is essentially the same as
those underlying standard reduced-form credit models such Duﬃe and Singleton
(1997, 1999), Pan and Singleton (2008), and many others. In particular, we model
idiosyncratic default as being triggered by the ﬁrst jump of a sovereign-speciﬁc
Poisson process. Let ξt denote the intensity of this Poisson process. Following
Longstaﬀ, Mithal, and Neis (2005), we assume that this intensity process follows a
standard square-root process,
dξ =( a − bξ) dt + c

ξd Z . (1)
10These dynamics allow for mean reversion and conditional heteroskedasticity in the
intensity process and guarantee that the intensity process is nonnegative. The
constants a, b,a n dc and the Brownian motion Z are sovereign speciﬁc. We place no
restrictions on the correlation structure of the Brownian motions across sovereigns
or on the correlation of idiosyncratic defaults across sovereigns.10
The second type of credit event is diﬀerent and can be viewed as a systemic
shock. This type of event has potential ramiﬁcations for all sovereigns within a
common area such as a monetary union. In particular, we assume that when a
systemic shock occurs, which is modeled as the arrival of a Poisson jump, each
sovereign has some probability of defaulting. The probability of default conditional
on the systemic shock, however, is sovereign speciﬁc and is denoted γ. Thus, some
sovereign borrowers may be more fragile or susceptible to systemic shocks than
others. Let λt denote the intensity of the Poisson process triggering a systemic
shock. This intensity also follows a standard square-root model,
dλ =( α − βλ ) dt + σ
√
λd Z λ, (2)
where α, β,a n dσ are constants, and Zλ is a Brownian motion that is uncorrelated
with the Brownian motions driving the idiosyncratic intensity processes.
Let us now consider the ways in which a sovereign default can occur in this
model. First, default occurs the ﬁrst time that there is an arrival of the sovereign-
speciﬁc Poisson process. Second, default occurs with probability γ the ﬁrst time
that there is an arrival of the systemic Poisson process (provided, of course, that
there has not been a previous idiosyncratic default). Third, default occurs with
probability (1−γ)γ the second time that there is an arrival of the systemic Poisson
process. This follows since the sovereign has a 1−γ probability of surviving the ﬁrst
systemic shock, but then faces a γ probability of succumbing to the second systemic
shock. Fourth, default occurs with probability (1−γ)2γ the third time that there is
an arrival of the systemic Poisson process, and so forth. Thus, there are an inﬁnite
number of ways in which a sovereign default can occur in this model. This contrasts
sharply with the usual univariate modeling framework in which default occurs the
ﬁrst time there is an arrival of the underlying Poisson process.
Given the properties of Poisson processes, and conditional on the realized paths
of the intensity processes ξt and λt, the probability that no default occurs by time
t equals,
10Note that since our framework allows idiosyncratic defaults to have some (al-
though not perfect) correlation acrosssovereigns,we are using the term idiosyncratic


















































γλ s + ξs ds

, (5)
Thus, we can now proceed to value credit derivatives the standard reduced-form
framework of Duﬃe and Singleton, but with the twist that the instantaneous prob-
ability of a default is proportional to γλ+ ξ.
Let rt denote the riskless rate. Although rt is stochastic, we assume that it
is independent of the intensity processes λt and ξt, and of the realizations of the
underlying Poisson processes. As we show later, this assumption greatly simpliﬁes
the model, but has little eﬀect on the empirical results. As in Lando (1998), we
make the assumption that a bondholder recovers a fraction 1 − w of the par value
of the bond in the event of default.
Given the independence assumption, we do not need to specify the risk-neutral
dynamics of the riskless rate to solve for CDS spreads. We require only that these
dynamics be such that the value of a riskless zero-coupon bond D(T) with maturity












Following Longstaﬀ, Mithal, and Neis (2005), it is now straightforward to represent
the values of U.S. Treasury or state CDS spreads in terms of simple expectations
under the risk-neutral measure. Let s denote the spread paid by the buyer of default
protection. Assuming that the premium is paid continuously, the present value of
































Setting the values of the two legs of the CDS contract equal to each other and






















Given the square-root dynamics for the intensity processes standard results such as
those in Duﬃe, Pan, and Singleton (2000) make it straightforward to derive closed-
form solutions for the expectations in Equation (9). The Appendix shows that the




0 D(t)( A(λ,t) C(ξ,t)+γB (ξ,t) F(λ,t) dt
 T
0 D(t) A(λ,t) B(ξ,t) dt
, (10)
where ξ and λ denote the current (or time-zero) values of the respective intensity
processes,
A(λ,t)=A1(t)e x p ( A2(t) λ), (11)
B(ξ,t)=B1(t)e x p ( B2(t) ξ), (12)
C(ξ,t)=( C1(t)+C2(t) ξ)e x p ( B2(t) ξ), (13)
F(λ,t)=( F1(t)+F2(t) λ)e x p ( A2(t) λ), (14)
and where,














σ2(1 − νe ψt)
, (16)








































































β2 +2 γσ2, (23)
ν =( β + ψ)/(β − ψ), (24)
φ =

b2 +2 c2, (25)
θ =( b + φ)/(b − φ). (26)
5. MODEL ESTIMATION
With these closed-form solutions, we can now estimate the model using market CDS
spreads. Speciﬁcally, we will estimate the model using the term structure of one-,
two-, three-, four-, and ﬁve-year CDS spreads for each issuer for each date during
the sample period. This results in a vector ¯ λ of estimates of the systemic intensity
process for each date in the sample period as well as a vector ¯ ξ of estimates for
the sovereign-speciﬁc intensity process for each issuer. In addition, this estimation
14approach provides estimates of the parameters of the systemic intensity process
and the sovereign-speciﬁc intensity processes, as well as the sensitivity coeﬃcient
for each issuer.
In estimating the model for the U.S. issuers, we also impose two minor identi-
fying restrictions. The ﬁrst is that the sensitivity coeﬃcient γ for the U.S. Treasury
is normalized to be one. Thus, the γ coeﬃcients for the states have the interpre-
tation as measuring systemic sensitivity relative to that of the U.S. Treasury. This
assumption is simply for convenience in scaling the results. Second, we make the
realistic assumption that a Treasury default can only occur in conjunction with a
systemic shock. This assumption makes intuitive sense since it is diﬃcult to imag-
ine a scenario in which the U.S. Treasury defaults without sending systemic shock
waves throughout the credit markets.
The values for the zero-coupon bonds D(t) that appear in the valuation formula
are bootstrapped from one-, three-, six-, and twelve-month LIBOR rates and two-,
three-, and ﬁve-year swap rates using a standard cubic spline interpolation algo-
rithm. For a description of this algorithm, see Longstaﬀ, Mithal, and Neis (2005).11
The LIBOR and swap data are obtained from the Bloomberg system. We will also
assume that the loss given default is 50 percent, implying w =0 .50.12
Let sijt denote the market spread for the i-th issuer for a CDS contract with
maturity j y e a r sa so fd a t et.L e t ˆ sijt be the corresponding value implied by
substituting in the estimated values of the systemic intensity λ and the sovereign-
speciﬁc intensity process ξi along with the estimated parameter vector θ into the
closed-form solution in Equation (10). The parameter vector and the time series of
the systemic intensity and sovereign-speciﬁc intensity processes are then estimated









[ sijt − ˆ sijt ]
2 . (27)
11An alternative approach would be to bootstrap zero-coupon bond prices from the
Treasury constant maturity rates reported by the Federal Reserve Board’s H.15
release. The results, however, are not sensitive to the choice of the discounting
curve. Intuitively, this is because the discounting curve is applied symmetrically
to the cash ﬂows from both legs of the CDS contract. Thus, bootstrapping zero-
coupon bond prices from the Treasury curve rather than the swap curve has little
eﬀect on the ﬁtted value of the CDS spread.
12Similarly, this assumption also has little eﬀect on the ﬁtted value of the CDS
spread since it is applied symmetrically to both legs of the CDS contract in the
estimation process.
15We follow the same procedure in estimating the model for the European sovereigns,
with the exception that the identiﬁcation conditions apply to Germany rather than
the U.S. Treasury.
The upper part of Table 5 reports the estimated parameters a, b,a n dc for the
sovereign-speciﬁc processes for the individual states, and the estimated parameters
α, β,a n dσ for the systemic process. The lower part of the table gives the corre-
sponding results for the European sovereigns. Table 5 also reports the asymptotic
standard errors for the parameters and the root mean squared error (RMSE) from
ﬁtting the model to the term structure of CDS spreads for each issuer.
Table 5 shows that the speed of mean reversion parameter b or β is negative
for many of the U.S. and European sovereigns. This feature is not uncommon in
estimating aﬃne models and does not pose a problem since we are estimating the
speed of mean reversion under the risk neutral measure rather than the objective
measure, and the speed of mean reversion parameter under the objective measure
is presumably positive. This argues that there might be a substantial diﬀerence
between the speed of mean reversion parameters across the two measures. In turn,
this implies that there could be a signiﬁcant risk premium embedded into the pricing
of U.S. and European sovereign CDS contracts.
Table 5 also shows that the model ﬁts the term structure of CDS spreads fairly
well. The RMSEs from ﬁtting the model to U.S. sovereign issuers range from a low
of about one basis point for the term structure of U.S. Treasury CDS contracts, to
a high of roughly 16 basis points for Illinois. Six of the states have RMSEs of less
than 10 basis points. Comparing these RMSEs to the average ﬁve-year CDS values
shown in Table 2 indicates that these RMSEs are a relatively small percentage of
the absolute level of CDS spreads for these issuers. Similar results hold for the
European sovereign issuers.
Finally, note that the systemic intensity process in the U.S. has parameters
that are very similar to those for the systemic intensity process in Europe. Simi-
larly, the model ﬁts both the term structure of U.S. Treasury CDS spreads and the
term structure of Germany CDS spreads very closely. The RMSEs from ﬁtting the
U.S. Treasury and German CDS term structures are 1.179 and 2.528 basis points,
respectively.
6. SYSTEMIC SOVEREIGN RISK
In this section, we examine the implications of the results for the systemic compo-
nent of sovereign default risk. First, we focus on the systemic sensitivity measures
estimated from the multivariate credit model. Next, we decompose the default
spread for each sovereign into its systemic and sovereign-speciﬁc components. We
16then contrast the nature of systemic sovereign risk in the U.S. with that in the EMU.
Finally, we explore the determinants of systemic sovereign risk using a regression
framework.
6.1 Systemic Credit Risk
Figure 1 plots the intensity λ of the systemic risk for the U.S. and the EMU. The
U.S. intensity has been, on average, higher than the EMU intensity. Thus, the
market perceives that a U.S. default is slightly higher than a German default. The
systemic default intensities of the U.S. and Europe are highly correlated at 0.9406.
This high degree of commonality in systemic risk across the U.S. and Euro market
areas is consistent with Longstaﬀ, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2011), who ﬁnd
that sovereign credit risk is highly correlated across countries. The high correlation
between the U.S. and EMU systemic intensities is also partly driven by our sample
period which covers the ﬁnancial crisis. As is well known, correlations tend to
increase during market downturns and crisis periods (see, for example, Ang and
Bekaert (2002)).












Figure 1. U.S. and European Systemic Sovereign Credit Risk
Factors. This ﬁgure plots the estimated time series of the intensityprocess
for the two systemic sovereign credit risk factors. The intensity process is
measured in basis points.
17The U.S. and European systemic intensities increase markedly during the last
quarter of 2008 after the default of Lehman Brothers (September 15, 2008). Both
systemic intensities reach their peaks of 102 and 90 basis points, respectively, at
the end of February 2009. If λ were constant, these intensities represent default
probabilities of 1 − exp(−0.0102) = 0.0101 and 1 − exp(−0.0090) = 0.0089 over
the next year. The increases in default intensities during the ﬁnancial crisis come
through two channels. First, there is an explicit increase of sovereign liabilities
by bringing onto sovereign balance sheets many of the liabilities of private banks
(in the U.S. through the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP), and loans and assistance to American International Group
(AIG) and auto manufacturers and in Germany the nationalization of Hypo Real
Estate and state supportof banks through the FinancialMarket Stabilization Fund).
Second, there is an implicit increase in the riskiness of sovereign ﬁnances through
the deterioration of economic conditions and the fragility of the banking sectors in
each country.
Systemic default intensities for both the U.S. and Europe decrease during the
ﬁrst three quarters of 2009. The U.S. intensity starts to increase in November 2009,
while the EMU intensity follows later in late December 2009. The U.S. increase may
reﬂect the large losses from Fannie Mae and increasing concerns about large deﬁcits
during that quarter. The increase in EMU systemic sovereign risk is likely due to the
deteriorating ﬁnances of Greece and the downgrading of Greek debt in December
2009. Since March 2010, the U.S. credit intensity has averaged 39 basis points,
representing a one-year probability of default of 0.0039 and has been fairly stable.
European systemic sovereign risk has been a little more volatile, increasing in April
and May 2010 and in December 2010 and January 2011. This volatility reﬂects the
European sovereigndebt crisisof Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and other Euro periphery
nations. Note that the European systemic default intensity is not elevated through
this period indicating that systemic European risk has been relatively subdued even
though the yields and default rates of other European nations dramatically increase
during this time.
6.2 Systemic Sensitivity
Recall from earlier discussion that the coeﬃcient γ represents the probability that
a sovereign defaults conditional on the realization of a systemic credit event. By
normalizing the value of γ to one for the U.S. Treasury, the estimated values of γ
for the other sovereigns represent the ratio of the conditional probability of default
for the sovereign to that of the United States. Similarly, we normalize the EMU
sovereigns by the conditional default probability for Germany. Thus, the estimated
values of γ c a nb ev i e w e da sa ni n d e xo fr e l a t i v es y s t e m i cd e f a u l tr i s k .
18Table 6 shows the estimated systemic default risk indexes. Surprisingly, nine
of the ten states studied actually have an systemic index of less than one. The
exception is California which has a systemic index of 2.647. The average value of
the systemic index taken over all ten states is 0.72; the median value of the systemic
index is 0.63. It is also interesting to observethat several of the states appear to have
little or no systemic default risk. In particular, Illinois, New York, and Ohio have
systemic indexes that are less than 0.10. These results have important implications
for the nature of state sovereign default risk in the U.S. since they imply that state
default risk is largely sovereign speciﬁc rather than systemic.
In stark contrast to the results for the states, Table 6 shows that systemic
default risk is far more important for the sovereigns in the European Union. In
particular, seven of the European sovereigns have systemic indexes in excess of one,
implying that their probability of a default given a systemic shock exceeds that of
Germany. The highest value of the systemic index is for Greece which has a value
of 4.688. The next highest values are for Italy, Portugal, Belgium, and Ireland with
indexes of 1.710, 1.674, 1.662, and 1.604, respectively. The smallest value for the
index is for Finland with a value of 0.356. The average value of the systemic index
taken over all ten European sovereigns is 1.597; the median value of the systemic
index is 1.555.
6.3 How Large is the Systemic Component?
As an alternative way of looking at systemic risk, it is also interesting to decompose
the total default risk of each sovereign into its systemic and sovereign-speciﬁc com-
ponents. Since the instantaneous default risk of each sovereign is γλ+ξ, the systemic
component is given simply by γλ while the sovereign-speciﬁc component is given
by ξ. Table 7 reports summary statistics for the systemic component expressed as
a percentage of the total default risk for each sovereign.
The results in Table 7 tell a similarstory as the results for the systemic index. In
particular, the size of the systemic component for the states is typically very small.
The average systemic percentage taken over all ten states is only 12.21 percent.
Even for California, which has the highest systemic index of γ =2 .647, the average
systemic component is only 36.78 percent of the total credit risk. This reinforces
the earlier evidence that state credit risk in the U.S. is largely sovereign-speciﬁc in
nature rather than systemic.
The results for European are again very diﬀerent from those for the U.S. The
systemic component taken over all European sovereigns is 30.94 percent; the median
is 37.03 percent. The smallest average among European sovereigns is 16.77 percent
for Ireland. The highest average among European sovereigns is 53.15 for France.
19Thus, the results indicate that systemic default risk tends to be two to three times
as large a component of default risk in Europe as it is in the U.S.
6.4 What Drives Systemic Sovereign Risk?
We next explore the determinants of systemic sovereign credit risk. Speciﬁcally, we
study the extent to which a set of domestic and global variables explain changes
in the systemic intensity values estimated previously. There are several important
reasons for focusing on intensity values rather than on individual CDS spreads.
First, the intensities implied from the model are based on the full term structure
of CDS spreads. Thus, this approach allows us to use all of the information in the
market about systemic credit risk. Second, the intensity reﬂects the current prob-
ability of a systemic event rather than a long-term average. This means that this
measure has the potential to be more responsive and, therefore, more informative
about the underlying drivers of systemic default risk. Third, our approach parallels
that of Duﬃe and Singleton (1997, 1999), Longstaﬀ, Mithal, and Neis (2005), Pan
and Singleton (2008), Longstaﬀ, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2011), and others
who study the properties of default intensities estimated from a model of the term
structure of credit spreads.
Since there is virtually an unlimited number of variables that could be related
to sovereign credit risk, it is important to be selective in the variables considered.
In particular, we will focus primarily on market-determined variables since we can
observe these at a higher frequency than other variables such as tax receipts or
budget deﬁcits (which are generally only available on an annual or semiannual
basis).
The ﬁrst set of four variables are taken from the domestic ﬁnancial markets.
For the U.S., we use the weekly return on the S&P 500 index (excluding dividends),
the weekly change in the ﬁve-year constant maturity swap rate, the weekly change
in the VIX volatility index, and the weekly change in the CDX North American
Investment Grade Index of CDS spreads. For Europe, we use the weekly return on
the DAX index, the weekly change in the ﬁve-year constant maturity Euro swap
rate, the weekly change in the VIX volatility index, and the weekly change in
the European ITraxx Index of CDS spreads. The data for these variables are all
obtained from the Bloomberg system.
The second set of explanatory variables consists of weekly changes in the ﬁve-
year CDS spreads for three sovereigns or sovereign indexes. In particular, we include
the weekly change in the CDS contract for Japan, China, and for the CDX Emerging
Market (CDX EM) Index of sovereign CDS spreads. The data for these CDS spreads
are also obtained from the Bloomberg system.
20Table 8 reports the results from the regressions of weekly changes in the default
risk for the issuers on the explanatory variables. Speciﬁcally, the table reports the
Newey-West t-statistics from the regressions along with the R2s.
Table 8 shows that U.S. systemic sovereign risk is strongly related to the ﬁ-
nancial market variables. In particular, the single most signiﬁcant variable in the
regression is the return on the stock market, which has a t-statistic of −4.31. Thus,
U.S. systemic credit risk declines signiﬁcantly as the stock market rallies, and vice
versa. This strongly suggests that the fortunes of the U.S. are closely linked to the
stock market. U.S. systemic risk is signiﬁcantly positively related to changes in the
swap rate, indicating that the level of interest rates has an important eﬀect on credit
risk. Interestingly, changes in the VIX index are signiﬁcantly negatively related to
U.S. systemic credit risk. This is consistent with the view that Treasury bonds
may play the role of a “reserve investment” in the ﬁnancial markets. Speciﬁcally,
that when uncertainty in the ﬁnancial markets increases, the resulting global ﬂight
to U.S. Treasury bonds makes it easier for the U.S. to ﬁnance its operations with
nominal debt. Finally, U.S. systemic credit risk is also positively related to changes
in investment grade corporate bond spreads (signiﬁcant at the ten-percent level).
The results also show that U.S. systemic risk is related to the credit spreads
of the two largest holders of U.S. Treasury debt. In particular, the t−statistic for
the CDS spread of Japan is 1.64 (which just misses signiﬁcance at the ten-percent
level), while the t-statistic for China is 1.80 which is signiﬁcant at the ten-percent
level. The R2 for the regression is 0.352, indicating that a substantial proportion
of U.S. systemic credit risk can be explained in terms of the ﬁnancial market and
global credit variables.
Turning now to the results for European systemic sovereign risk, we see a very
similar pattern. European systemic risk is again signiﬁcantly negatively related
to stock market returns. As for the U.S., European systemic risk is signiﬁcantly
positively related to changes in corporate credit spreads. Note that the coeﬃcient
for changes in the VIX is not signiﬁcant, consistent with the intuition of the unique
role played by U.S. Treasury debt discussed above. Finally, European systemic risk
is strongly positively related to the CDS spread of China. As before, the R2 of
0.431 for this regression indicates that much of the variation in European systemic
sovereign risk is captured by these ﬁnancial market variables.
7. SOVEREIGN-SPECIFIC CREDIT RISK
In this section, we examine the properties of the sovereign-speciﬁc or idiosyncratic
component of sovereign default risk. We ﬁrst explore whether there is a geographic
structure to sovereign-speciﬁc risk using a multivariate cluster analysis. We then
21examine whether the extent to which the key ﬁnancial and global variables are able
to explain variation in sovereign-speciﬁc credit risk.
7.1 Does Geography Matter?
To provide an alternative perspective on the cross-sectional structure of default
risk, we conduct a multivariate cluster analysis of the correlation matrix of weekly
changes in the estimated sovereign-speciﬁc components. In this cluster analysis, the
algorithm attempts to sort the states into groups where the members of each group
are as similar as possible. At the same time, the algorithm attempts to form the
groups to be as dissimilar from one another as possible. In eﬀect, the algorithm tries
to create groupings in a way that maximizes the average correlation between coun-
tries in the same group, while minimizing the average correlation between countries
in diﬀerent groups.13 Since the composition of clusters depends on the choice of the
number of clusters to be formed, we use a simple rule of thumb that the number of
clusters be roughly N/3, where N is the number of individual items to be grouped.
For the 10 sovereigns in the U.S. and the ten in Europe, this rule of thumb sug-
gests forming three clusters (we exclude the U.S. Treasury and Germany since, by
assumption, their default risk is due entirely to the systemic factor).
Table 9 reports the composition of the clusters. Although we present the clus-
ters in order of the numberof issuers each contains, there is no particularsigniﬁcance
to this ordering in cluster analysis. Similarly, the cluster analysis algorithm does not
place any restrictions on the number of items that can appear in any cluster (other
than the obvious requirement that a cluster has to contain at least one element).
The results illustrate that there is a strong regional ﬂavor to state credit risk.
In particular, the ﬁrst cluster contains ﬁve states, four of which are located in
Midwest/Central part of the U.S: Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and Texas. The second
cluster consists primarily of states on the East and West Coasts such as New York,
New Jersey, and California. The third cluster consists only of Florida. This suggests
that the credit risk of Florida is suﬃciently distinct from that of the other states
that the algorithm places it in a separate category altogether.
Turning to the results for Europe, a somewhat diﬀerent pattern emerges. In
particular, the largest cluster consists of the European periphery: Greece, Ireland,
13The cluster analysis is done using Ward’s method in which clusters are formed
so as to minimize the increase in the within-cluster sums of squares. The distance
between two clusters is the increase in these sums of squares if the two clusters were
merged. A method for computing this distance from a squared Euclidean distance
matrix is given by Anderberg (1973, pages 142-145).
22Italy, Portugal, and Spain – all countries that have experienced moderate or severe
ﬁnancial distress recently. Thus, there is a clear “misery loves company” struc-
ture to the correlation matrix of sovereign-speciﬁc spread changes. This pattern is
also consistent with the second cluster which consists of Austria, Finland, and the
Netherlands, which have all represented strong credits through the global ﬁnancial
crisis. The third cluster shows the most geographical similarity since France and
Belgium are neighbors and share many common features such as language. We
will next examine in further detail the time series of the state-speciﬁc and country-
speciﬁc intensity processes.
7.2 State-Speciﬁc Sovereign Risk
Figure 2 plots the states-speciﬁc intensities of the states in the various clusters
shown in Table 9. Panel A plots the state-speciﬁc ξ intensities of the states in the
ﬁrst cluster: Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio, and Texas. The states in this
cluster all exhibit two large increases in credit risk, beginning with the start of the
ﬁnancial crisis in 2008 when U.S. systemic credit risk also increases (see Figure 1)
and again in 2010. These state-speciﬁc intensities are large; Michigan’s intensity
reaches a peak of 740 basis points in April 2009 and Illinois’ maximum intensity is
680 basis points in June 2010.
The increase in default intensities during 2010 reﬂects diﬀerent circumstances
for diﬀerent states. Using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Illinois has
the largest debt to GDP ratio, 20.6 percent, in 2009 of all the states considered in the
sample and ﬁnanced the largest projected deﬁcit to GDP ratio in 2011, 2.7 percent,
according to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. Massachusetts moved
from budget surpluses during the late 1990s to budget deﬁcits during our sample
period, resulting from a combination of reducing taxes prior to the ﬁnancial crisis
and increased demand for social services during the ﬁnancial downturn. Similarly,
estimates of budget deﬁcits for Texas started increasing dramatically in June 2010
to top $20 billion. In early January 2011, Texas legislators eventually cut spending
by more than $30 billion.
Panel B of Figure 2 graphs the state-speciﬁc intensities for the states in the
second cluster: California, Nevada, New Jersey, and New York. California’s state-
speciﬁc default risk appears to be similar to these other states, so its overall high
default probabilities are due to California’s large loading on U.S. systemic risk
(see Table 6). The intensities for these four states are highly correlated with an
average cross-correlation of 90 percent. These states share a number of similarities:
California and Nevada have the highest state unemployment rates among the states
considered over the sample and California and Nevada have been very hard hit
by declining property prices. Although much smaller than its neighboring state
23California, it is not surprisingthat Nevada is exposed to many of the same economic
forces facing California. Similarly, New Jersey and New York are adjoining states
and there is a high linkage of these economies. This may explain the increase
in the states’ intensities in February 2010 and June 2010. California and New
York’s ﬁscal years end in March 2010 and the challenges for both states in meeting
budget deﬁcits could have spilled over to shared concerns in the neighboring states.
Similarly, the increase in intensities in June 2010 may reﬂect the diﬃculties in
ﬁnancing deﬁcits for the budget deadline of July 1 for California and the June 28
deadline for approving New York’s budget bill, which if not passed would have led
to a New York government shut down.
Finally, Panel C of Figure 2 graphs the default intensity of the third cluster,
which consists of just Florida. Unlike the ﬁrst two clusters, Florida saw a very early
spike in its state-speciﬁc intensity in July 2008. This coincides with the bailouts
and credit lines provided to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to deal with deteriorating
conditions in the mortgage market, to which Florida was highly exposed.
7.3 Euro Country-Speciﬁc Sovereign Risk
In Figure 3, we plot country-speciﬁc intensities ξ for the Euro members. Panel A
graphs the intensities for the countries in the ﬁrst cluster: Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal, and Spain, all of which are Euro periphery countries. Policymakers have
been preoccupied in managing ﬁnancing and avoiding default for these countries
since the ﬁnancial crisis. Interestingly, all these countries, with the exception of
Greece, saw large increases in their sovereign-speciﬁc default risk from late 2008
through 2009. This mirrors the increase in German systemic risk and corporate
default rates over this time. It is only in January2010 that Greek-speciﬁc intensities
start to rise, even though knowledge of Greece’s growing deﬁcits and ﬁnancing
problems were well known in 2009. The intensity for Greece rises from 187 basis
points at the end of December 2009 to close to 10 percent at the beginning of May
2010. This is when Ireland’s intensity starts to rapidly increase, also reaching nearly
10 percent at the end of the sample. This is due to market perceptions that Ireland’s
measures taken in 2008–2009 to ﬁx the problems in its banking sector are insuﬃcient
and additional measures, involving co-ordinated Euro action, are necessary.
Panel B of Figure 3 plots the intensities for the countries in the second clus-
ter: Austria, Finland, and the Netherlands. As is the case for the states (see
Figure 2) and the countries in the ﬁrst cluster, default intensities rise during the
ﬁnancial crisis. They remain elevated, and for the Netherlands also increase, after
2009. In contrast, the Belgian and French country-speciﬁc default risk shown in
Panel C barely changes during the ﬁnancial crisis. Clearly, most of the variation
in the default risk of Belgium and France during the 2008–2009 period was due to


































Figure 2. State-Speciﬁc Credit Risk for the U.S. Clusters. The
upper, middle, and lower panels plot the state-speciﬁc intensity process
for the states in the ﬁrst, second, and third clusters, respectively. The
intensities are measured in basis points.
changes in systemic risk. Only towards the end of the sample do Belgian and French
sovereign-speciﬁc intensities start to increase.





































Figure 3. Country-Speciﬁc Credit Risk for the European Clus-
ters. The upper, middle, and lower panels plots the country-speciﬁc in-
tensity processes for the countries in the ﬁrst, second, and third European
clusters, respectively. The intensities are measured in basis points.
7.4 What Drives Sovereign-Speciﬁc Credit Risk?
26Given the evidence of common patterns in the country-speciﬁc default intensities
in Figures 2 and 3, we now investigate the determinants of sovereign-speciﬁc credit
risk. We regress weekly changes in the sovereign-speciﬁc intensity for each issuer
on the same set of ﬁnancial market and global explanatory variables used in the
systemic regressions. Table 10 reports the results from these regressions.
A number of interesting patterns can be seen in these results. For example,
the explanatory power of these regressions is generally lower for the U.S. sovereigns
than for the European sovereigns. In particular, the average R2 for the U.S. and
European sovereigns is 0.122 and 0.181, respectively.
One possible reason for the higher explanatory power in Europe may be that
the ITraxx corporate index is signiﬁcantly positive (at the ten-percent level) for all
but one of the European sovereigns. This result parallels the ﬁndings in Longstaﬀ,
Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2011) that global sovereign CDS spreads are strongly
related to corporate spreads. In contrast, the corporate index is only signiﬁcant for
several of the U.S. states.
Another intriguing pattern in Table 10 is that stock market returns are signiﬁ-
cant for a number of states: Florida, New Jersey, New York, and Ohio. In contrast,
stock market returns are only signiﬁcant for Austria. Thus, sovereign-speciﬁc risk
in the U.S. is more linked to equity markets than is the case in Europe. One reason
for this might be that U.S. sovereigns have a greater reliance on capital gains income
tax receipts than do European sovereigns.
8. CONCLUSION
This paper studies the nature of systemic sovereign credit risk by examining the
pricing of CDS contracts on the U.S. Treasury, a number of key U.S. states, and
major EMU countries. An important advantage of comparing the U.S. with Europe
is that the analysis can provide new insights into whether systemic sovereign credit
risk arises from common macroeconomic fundamentals or from the inﬂuence of
global ﬁnancial markets.
Using a multifactor aﬃne credit model, we are able to decompose sovereign
credit risk into a systemic component and a sovereign-speciﬁc component. We ﬁnd
that systemic risk represents a much smaller fraction of total credit risk for U.S.
states than is the case for members of the EMU. This result is surprising since we
would expect U.S. states to be more closely linked in terms of their economic fun-
damentals. This result provides clear evidence against the hypothesis that systemic
risk is primarily an artifact of common macroeconomic fundamentals.
We ﬁnd that U.S. systemic sovereign credit risk is highly correlated with Eu-
27ropean systemic credit risk. Furthermore, we show that both are strongly related
to ﬁnancial market variables such as stock returns. This argues that systemic risk
may arise largely through the global ﬁnancial system.
One particularly intriguing result of our analysis is that U.S. systemic credit
risk is signiﬁcantlynegatively related to changes in the VIX index. Thus, as markets
become more volatile, the credit risk of the U.S. Treasury improves. This result is
consistent with the hypothesis that the ﬁnancial position of the U.S. improves as
ﬂights to quality occur in turbulent periods.
The results in this paper have many important implications for sovereign credit
risk. Clearly, future work is needed to understand the deep reasons for the strong
relation between systemic sovereign risk and ﬁnancial markets.
28APPENDIX
After multiplying terms, taking expectations, and rearranging, the numerator of









































Let A(λ,t) denote the ﬁrst expectation in this expression. Standard results such as




λAλλ +( α − βλ)Aλ − γλA− At =0 , (A2)
subject to the boundary condition A(λ,0) = 1. Substituting the expression for
A(λ,t) given in Equation (11) into Equation (A2) shows that the partial diﬀerential
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Integrating Equation (A3) for A2(t), and then substituting A2(t)i n t oE q u a t i o n
(A4) and integrating for A1(t) gives Equations (15) and (16) after using the initial
conditions A1(0) = 1 and A2(0) = 0 to determine the constants. The same proce-
dure can be used to verify that the third expectation in Equation (A1) is given by
Equation (12) (where the parameters α, β,a n dσ are replaced by a, b,a n dc in the
partial diﬀerential equation and γ is set equal to one).
Let F(λ,t) denote the fourth expectation in Equation (A1). Standard results
can again be used to show that F(λ,t) satisﬁes the partial diﬀerential equation in
Equation (A2) with the boundary condition F(λ,0) = λ. Substituting the expres-
sion for F(λ,t) into Equation (A2) shows that the partial diﬀerential equation is
satisﬁed provided that F1(t)a n dF2(t) satisfy the Riccati equations,
29(α + σ





αF2 + αF1A2 − F 
1 =0 . (A6)
Integrating Equation (A5) for F2(t), and then substituting F2(t)i n t oE q u a t i o n
(A6) and integrating for F1(t) gives Equations (21) and (22) after using the initial
conditions F1(0) = 0 and F2(0) = 1 to determine the constants. The sameprocedure
can be used to verify that the second expectation in Equation (A1) is given by
Equation (13). The solution for the sovereign CDS spread s in Equation (10) is
then given by substituting the expressions for the respective expectations given in
Equations (11) through (14) into the numerator and denominator of Equation (9).
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34Table 1
Nominal 2009 GDP in Millions of U.S. Dollars This table reports the 2009 Nominal GDP
for the indicated States and Countries. GDP is measured in millions of U.S. dollars. Data from the
























Summary Statistics for U.S. and European Sovereign CDS Spreads. This table reports summary statistics for the ﬁve-year CDS
spreads for the indicated sovereigns. The sample consists of weekly observations for the May 14, 2008 to January 5, 2011 period.
Std. Serial
Mean Dev. Min. Med. Max. Corr. N
California 243.57 81.98 63.00 268.00 402.00 0.962 133
Florida 137.10 50.47 39.00 135.00 240.00 0.960 133
Illinois 187.61 87.32 25.00 191.00 369.00 0.982 130
Massachusetts 120.93 54.67 21.00 124.00 243.00 0.978 134
Michigan 207.45 87.76 45.00 218.00 394.00 0.976 131
Nevada 171.76 73.03 42.00 183.00 329.00 0.967 138
New Jersey 179.06 76.31 33.00 196.00 337.00 0.973 135
New York 176.95 77.19 32.00 196.00 318.00 0.976 131
Ohio 122.04 52.04 35.00 125.00 251.00 0.972 134
Texas 86.82 42.01 20.00 79.00 180.00 0.976 134
USA 38.52 18.06 7.10 37.98 99.26 0.964 139
Austria 82.78 47.29 6.80 77.82 260.90 0.952 136
Belgium 75.63 48.76 10.00 62.01 227.68 0.977 139
Finland 31.04 16.59 5.30 28.98 88.33 0.970 139
France 47.49 26.95 6.75 43.78 108.84 0.975 139
Germany 33.56 17.16 4.40 33.75 90.61 0.959 139
Greece 353.34 316.99 32.19 230.25 1055.41 0.986 139
Ireland 205.94 143.40 17.30 162.48 613.43 0.982 139
Italy 121.86 58.34 24.75 113.68 241.03 0.963 139
Netherlands 44.58 26.38 6.30 41.27 123.33 0.970 139
Portugal 155.43 133.54 21.33 93.84 500.02 0.978 139
Spain 126.61 80.54 24.25 98.83 349.90 0.977 139Table 3
Correlation Matrix of Weekly Changes in CDS Spreads. The top panel of this table reports the correlation matrix of weekly ﬁve-year
CDS spread changes for the U.S. sovereigns. The bottom panel reports the correlation matrix of weekly ﬁve-year CDS spread changes for the
European sovereigns. The sample consists of weekly observations for the May 14, 2008 to January 5, 2011 period.
U.S. CA FL IL MA MI NV NJ NY OH TX USA
CA 1.000
FL 0.425 1.000
IL 0.657 0.529 1.000
MA 0.595 0.410 0.653 1.000
MI 0.678 0.323 0.691 0.773 1.000
NV 0.610 0.305 0.514 0.647 0.617 1.000
NJ 0.726 0.352 0.615 0.665 0.683 0.630 1.000
NY 0.721 0.428 0.648 0.664 0.716 0.668 0.842 1.000
OH 0.633 0.432 0.722 0.827 0.844 0.637 0.696 0.700 1.000
TX 0.614 0.351 0.590 0.771 0.748 0.577 0.647 0.572 0.777 1.000
USA 0.320 0.158 0.197 0.259 0.278 0.283 0.280 0.262 0.270 0.364 1.000
EUROPE AUS BEL FIN FRA GER GRE IRE ITA NET POR SPA
AUS 1.000
BEL 0.589 1.000
FIN 0.816 0.649 1.000
FRA 0.691 0.727 0.664 1.000
GER 0.745 0.713 0.720 0.820 1.000
GRE 0.319 0.330 0.327 0.411 0.392 1.000
IRE 0.650 0.529 0.542 0.544 0.533 0.559 1.000
ITA 0.573 0.580 0.584 0.597 0.536 0.553 0.675 1.000
NET 0.716 0.668 0.785 0.587 0.665 0.325 0.548 0.554 1.000
POR 0.343 0.420 0.358 0.469 0.395 0.771 0.755 0.691 0.398 1.000
SPA 0.503 0.567 0.493 0.563 0.485 0.727 0.738 0.808 0.560 0.845 1.000Table 4
Principal Components Analysis Results. This table reports summary statistics for the principal
components analysis of the correlation matrix of weekly changes in ﬁve-year CDS spreads for the U.S. and
European sovereigns. The correlation matrix is computed using all available overlapping observations
for each pairwise correlation.
Cumulative
Principal Percentage Percentage
Region Component Explained Explained
USA First 61.83 61.83
Second 8.45 70.28
Third 7.48 77.76
Europe First 62.40 62.40
Second 14.95 77.35
Third 5.19 82.54Table 5
Estimation Results for the CDS Valuation Model Using Federal and State CDS Spreads. This table reports the parameter
estimates and their standard errors obtained by ﬁtting the CDS valuation model to the term structure of CDS spreads for the indicated Federal
and State CDS contracts. For the systemic processes, the parameters reported are α, β,a n dσ. The RMSEs are measured in basis points. The
sample consists of weekly observations for the May 14, 2008 to July 16, 2010 period.
Parameter Standard Error
ab c abc RMSE
California 0.00250 −0.1768 0.1064 0.00013 0.0114 0.0254 11.790
Florida 0.00306 0.1912 0.0268 0.00015 0.0187 0.2914 9.384
Illinois −0.00010 −0.0566 0.0096 0.00019 0.0094 0.2592 15.758
Massachusetts 0.00140 0.0813 0.0174 0.00005 0.0068 0.1290 4.115
Michigan 0.00214 0.0549 0.0440 0.00018 0.0151 0.1074 13.448
Nevada 0.00171 −0.0508 0.1724 0.00012 0.0153 0.0246 10.218
New Jersey 0.00092 −0.0332 0.0253 0.00011 0.0135 0.1466 9.505
New York 0.00206 −0.1980 0.0607 0.00009 0.0064 0.0252 7.549
Ohio 0.00108 −0.0796 0.2172 0.00004 0.0043 0.0049 3.595
Texas 0.00091 0.0914 0.0389 0.00007 0.0135 0.1213 5.419
US Systemic 0.00009 −0.4720 0.2868 0.00001 0.0041 0.0020 1.179
Austria 0.00006 −0.0976 0.0506 0.00005 0.0176 0.0901 5.592
Belgium −0.00019 −0.4646 0.2319 0.00002 0.0091 0.0070 4.181
Finland 0.00033 −0.1356 0.0228 0.00002 0.0188 0.1950 2.253
France −0.00026 −0.4346 0.2013 0.00001 0.0065 0.0056 1.632
Greece 0.00081 −0.9786 0.5692 0.00022 0.0194 0.0083 51.694
Ireland 0.00115 −0.2562 0.3291 0.00010 0.0083 0.0076 12.742
Italy 0.00136 −0.1176 0.1623 0.00008 0.0166 0.0288 8.904
Netherlands 0.00041 0.0136 0.0954 0.00002 0.0175 0.0571 2.548
Portugal 0.00063 −0.1926 0.2969 0.00012 0.0115 0.0126 16.556
Spain 0.00129 −0.0792 0.2232 0.00009 0.0118 0.0182 10.153
Euro Systemic 0.00042 −0.4332 0.2672 0.00002 0.0161 0.0056 2.528Table 6
Systemic Default Indexes This table reports the estimated value of the systemic default index
parameter γ and its standard error for the indicated sovereigns. The value of γ is constrained to be
1.000 for the USA and Germany. The sample consists of weekly observations for the May 14, 2008









New Jersey 0.982 0.041














Spain 1.506 0.036Table 7
Summary Statistics for the Percentage Systemic Component of U.S. and European Sovereign Default Risk. This table reports
summary statistics for the percentage that the systemic component represents of the total credit risk of the indicated sovereigns. The sample
consists of weekly observations for the May 14, 2008 to January 5, 2011 period.
Std.
Mean Dev. Min. Med. Max. N
California 36.78 13.62 17.60 32.16 92.81 133
Florida 18.18 12.32 5.80 14.53 73.17 133
Illinois 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 130
Massachusetts 10.59 6.02 3.46 9.49 40.07 134
Michigan 8.83 4.33 3.35 7.71 26.76 131
Nevada 13.63 6.24 6.27 12.11 47.64 138
New Jersey 15.05 5.55 7.15 13.59 36.72 135
New York 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 131
Ohio 1.28 0.38 0.62 1.22 2.50 134
Texas 17.73 9.73 5.58 15.42 60.01 134
USA 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 139
Austria 34.31 16.16 0.00 30.76 100.00 136
Belgium 56.87 25.23 0.00 67.67 89.97 139
Finland 39.75 22.20 0.00 33.49 100.00 138
France 53.15 23.70 0.00 55.99 92.58 139
Germany 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 139
Greece 44.48 30.24 0.00 35.00 100.00 138
Ireland 16.77 9.82 0.00 15.30 45.71 139
Italy 31.84 15.36 0.00 31.32 71.60 139
Netherlands 39.79 21.10 0.00 34.27 100.00 138
Portugal 32.84 26.78 0.00 22.24 96.01 139
Spain 28.24 19.53 0.00 22.32 79.74 139Table 8
Regression Results for Systemic Risk. This table reports the t-statistics and other summary statistics from the regression of weekly
changes in the systemic credit process on the indicated variables. Mkt denotes the return on the S&P500 for the US, and the return on the
DAX for Europe. VIX denotes the weekly change in the VIX volatility index. Corp denotes the weekly change in the CDX IG index for the
US, and the weekly change in the ITraxx index for Europe. Japan, China, and EM denote the weekly changes in the CDS spreads for the
respective sovereigns or sovereign indexes. The sample consists of weekly observations for the May 14, 2008 to January 5, 2011 period.
Region Intercept Mkt Swap VIX Corp Japan China EM R2 N
US Systemic 0.55 −4.31∗∗ 2.60∗∗ −2.83∗∗ 1.80∗ 1.64 1.80∗ −0.50 0.352 138
Euro Systemic 0.56 −1.97∗∗ −0.61 −1.60 1.86∗ 1.44 2.67∗∗ 1.02 0.431 138Table 9
Credit Clusters. This table reports the clusters formed on the basis of the correlation matrix of the weekly changes in the nonsystemic
sovereign credit processes. The pairwise correlations in the correlation matrix are computed using all available overlapping observations for
each pair.
Region Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3










Regression Results for the Sovereign-Speciﬁc Credit Processes. This table reports the t-statistics and other summary statistics from
the regression of weekly changes in the sovereign-speciﬁc credit processes on the indicated variables. Mkt denotes the return on the S&P500 for
the US, and the return on the DAX for Europe. VIX denotes the weekly change in the VIX volatility index. Corp denotes the weekly change
in the CDX IG index for the US, and the weekly change in the ITraxx index for Europe. Japan, China, and EM denote the weekly changes in
the CDS spreads for the respective sovereigns or sovereign indexes. The sample consists of weekly observations for the May 14, 2008 to January
5, 2011 period.
Region Intercept Mkt Swap VIX Corp Japan China EM R2 N
California 0.48 −0.31 −2.51∗∗ −0.31 0.13 −0.50 −0.08 −1.11 0.094 132
Florida 0.14 −1.77∗ −2.11∗∗ −0.82 −2.07∗∗ 0.55 −3.52∗∗ −3.17∗∗ 0.136 132
Illinois 1.45 −1.64 −1.39 −0.07 −1.66∗ −0.84 0.81 −1.54 0.135 129
Massachusetts 0.73 −1.50 −0.89 −1.50 −0.13 1.19 −0.40 −1.24 0.074 133
Michigan 0.51 −0.63 −1.84∗ −1.44 0.08 0.66 −0.03 −1.57 0.113 130
Nevada 0.70 −0.93 −0.19 −0.56 0.68 −0.47 −0.33 −1.41 0.089 137
New Jersey 0.44 −2.56∗∗ −1.62 −2.41∗∗ −0.99 0.05 0.19 −1.58 0.132 134
New York 0.33 −1.95∗ −1.13 −1.66∗ −1.75∗ 0.36 0.71 −3.19∗∗ 0.217 130
Ohio 0.94 2.35∗∗ −0.80 1.83∗ 2.63∗∗ −0.58 2.81∗∗ 2.69∗∗ 0.144 133
Texas 0.31 −0.18 −1.10 −0.31 0.02 1.96∗∗ −0.11 −0.89 0.082 133
Austria 0.04 −2.21∗∗ −0.62 −2.49∗∗ 1.98∗∗ 1.36 0.76 0.12 0.336 135
Belgium 1.52 0.85 −0.97 −0.86 1.78∗ −0.51 −0.91 −0.97 0.061 138
Finland −0.21 −0.83 −0.58 −0.85 1.99∗∗ 0.37 0.96 0.67 0.281 137
France 1.37 0.47 −1.52 0.74 2.01∗∗ −0.07 −2.83∗∗ −1.41 0.147 138
Greece 1.42 1.34 −1.01 −1.69∗ 1.42 −0.72 −2.05∗∗ −1.73∗ 0.086 137
Ireland 1.70∗ −1.32 −2.20∗∗ −2.13∗∗ 2.24∗∗ 0.06 0.41 0.71 0.184 138
Italy 0.78 −0.63 −2.34∗∗ −0.74 2.71∗∗ −0.82 −1.17 −0.13 0.232 138
Netherlands 0.15 −0.52 0.05 −1.32 1.85∗ 1.03 1.22 0.53 0.177 137
Portugal 0.94 0.96 −2.56∗∗ −0.55 1.87∗ −1.27 −1.03 0.65 0.161 138
Spain 1.33 −0.02 −1.84∗ −1.36 2.26∗∗ −0.98 −1.06 −0.59 0.146 138